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Regulation of the Environment and  
Natural Resources 
Introduction and Overview 
On July 9, 2020, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in McGirt v. 
Oklahoma. Although the only actual effect of that decision was on Mr. McGirt’s state 
court criminal conviction, rendering it invalid in light of the continuing existence of 
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s reservation, the implications of McGirt reverberated 
throughout Oklahoma and the nation. By rejecting Oklahoma’s arguments that the 
march to statehood had resulted in the implicit disestablishment of the Creek’s 
reservation (and, by analogy, those of the neighboring and similarly situated 
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Seminole Nations), Justice Gorsuch’s opinion on 
behalf of the Court’s majority reaffirmed that nearly all of eastern Oklahoma remains 
Indian Country. The governments of those Five Tribes now face the practical 
challenges posed by reclaiming territorial sovereignty mostly denied to them for over 
a century.  
That work of rebuilding tribal sovereignty poses much difficulty and significant 
opportunities. This project, McGirt and the Work of Rebuilding of Tribal Nations: A 
Tribal Nation Building Colloquium, is focused on assisting tribal governments and 
others in assessing and tackling those challenges. The Colloquium’s thesis best 
describes this objective: 
…McGirt carr[ies] challenging implications [including] the potential 
for important expansions of tribal powers – across broad swaths of 
tribal governmental responsibilities. At the same time, a number of 
non-tribal governments are sounding alarms that threaten 
heightened hostility to tribal sovereignty. Ample evidence exists to 
drive home the point that hostility between Tribal governments and 
their non-Tribal counterparts seldom serves the interests of either 
of their respective citizenry. It will be critical for Tribal leaders and 
non-tribal political actors to approach the exercise of Tribal powers 
in the post-McGirt era with wisdom and vision founded on facts, 
evidence, and sound legal principles. 
Therefore, through a series of briefing papers on a variety of topics, the Colloquium 
aims to provide “theoretically sound and fact-grounded examples and lessons that 
can help to separate the prose from the poetry of Tribal sovereignty and 
governance.” This briefing paper does so in the context of environmental regulation 
and natural resources. 
Environmental regulation and the management of natural resources presents a 
number and range of complex legal and policy issues for tribal and non-tribal 
decision-makers. This briefing paper aims to assist those facing the thicket of these 




then focusing on environmental regulation in the context of oil and gas 
development, natural resource management in the context of hunting and fishing, 
and water rights and the management of water. For each of these issues, the paper 
provides the more specific legal framework, assesses risks and opportunities post-
McGirt, and offers relevant examples and lessons. 
Relevant Legal Principles and Background 
Despite its narrow focus criminal jurisdiction, McGirt was never just about Mr. 
McGirt’s conviction. Both the State of Oklahoma and a number of amici urged the 
Supreme Court to consider the potential practical consequences of recognizing the 
Creek Nation’s reservation boundaries. These included the specter of a number of 
wide-ranging civil and regulatory impacts, including the possibility that such a 
decision could “authorize greater, and potentially exclusive, tribal and federal 
regulation over lands, businesses, and energy resource development.”1  
The Supreme Court rejected these alleged practical consequences and instead 
applied its long-standing precedent requiring express Congress language to 
disestablish a reservation.2 In doing so, the Court dismissed concerns over civil and 
regulatory jurisdiction as misplaced and not before the Court but noted that it was 
proceeding “well aware of the potential for cost and conflict around [those] 
jurisdictional boundaries, especially ones that have gone unappreciated for so 
long.”3  
In the context of regulation over lands, environmental protection, and natural 
resources, both the Five Tribes and the State of Oklahoma, as well as their citizens 
and local communities, are facing the “potential for [those] cost[s] and conflict[s] 
around jurisdictional boundaries.” To support their efforts to avoid or minimize that 
potential, this paper begins with a brief overview of the relevant jurisdictional 
boundaries. 
A. Shifting Jurisdictional Boundaries 
The upshot of McGirt is that the reservations of the Five Tribes, which were 
established and guaranteed by their treaties with the United States, remain extant. 
The legal import of that decision is rooted in federal law, which defines “Indian 
country” to include “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation.”4 Therefore, in 
determining that the Creek Reservation (and those similarly situated) was not 
 
1 Brief of Amicus Curiae Envtl. Fed. of Oklahoma, Inc. et al., McGirt v. Oklahoma, Case No. 
18-9526, 2 (filed on March 20, 2020). 
2 McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2462 (2020) (“To determine whether a tribe 
continues to hold a reservation, there is only one place we may look: the Acts of Congress.”) 
3 McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2481. 




diminished or disestablished, the Supreme Court confirmed that all land within the 
reservation’s boundaries, regardless of ownership, is Indian Country and, as such, 
subject to unique jurisdictional rules, like the Major Crimes Act at issue in McGirt.  
Reservation boundaries and the limits of Indian Country have important 
consequences for civil and regulatory authority as well. Historically, the Supreme 
Court recognized that tribal territories encompassed distinct political communities, 
with which the United States entered treaty relations and thereby assumed 
important obligations to the exclusion of state interests or authority.5 This general 
concept, rooted in the government-to-government relationship expressed through 
treaties, is foundational to federal Indian law and remains relevant for understanding 
the continuing prohibition of state power over tribes and tribal members within 
reservations.6 
Over time, however, the bright line rule that states have no power or role in Indian 
Country has shifted when it comes to state authority over non-tribal members. 
During the allotment era of the late 1800s and early 1900s, for example, the United 
States opened reservation lands to settlement and purchase by non-tribal members 
and, as a result, many previously intact reservations became “checkerboarded” with 
different types of land ownership. As a result, the Supreme Court’s reliance on its 
early conception of tribal authority has evolved.  
Primarily, this evolution has led the Court to analyze assertions of state authority 
over non-tribal members in Indian Country within the context of preemption rather 
than simply ask whether such authority would infringe upon tribal sovereignty.7 This 
preemption analysis relies upon a judicial balancing of competing federal, tribal, and 
state interests, analysis of relevant federal treaties or laws, and moves consideration 
of tribal sovereignty as a backdrop against which to conduct that assessment.8 
Where such a review determines that federal and tribal interests outweigh the 
state’s interest in asserting authority, that state power is preempted.9 In other 
instances, however, the Supreme Court has relied on the significance of state 
interests, services, and activities to uphold incursions of state power over non-tribal 
members in Indian Country.10 
In addition, the history of allotment has profoundly impacted the Supreme Court’s 
analysis of tribal regulatory authority in Indian Country. Beginning with Montana v. 
United States, a case in which the Crow Tribe sought to prohibit non-Indians from 
fishing and hunting on non-Indian owned lands within the Tribe’s reservation, Court 
 
5 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) 
6 See, e.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973); California 
v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-15 (1987). 
7 See, e.g., McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 171 (noting that “the [Indian sovereignty] doctrine has 
undergone considerable evolution in response to changed circumstances”).  
8 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).  
9 See, e.g., Id.; New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 




drastically shifted the jurisdictional analysis from consideration of the reservation’s 
exterior boundaries to assessment of individual parcels of land.11 There, relying on 
its own review of the allotment era’s policy goals, the Court directly linked the 
process of allotment to limitations on tribal regulatory authority, saying that “[i]t 
defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians 
purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an 
avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal 
government.”12  
Nonetheless, the Montana Court recognized that some tribal authority over non-
tribal members extends across all lands within Indian Country. Although generally 
not the case, the Court cautioned that, “[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent 
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.”13 The Court defined these instances as 
follows: 
[1] A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the 
activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or 
its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements[; and] 
[2] A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct 
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.14 
This conception of tribal regulatory authority has evolved into a “pathmarking” 
establishment of the general “Montana rule” limiting tribal authority and the 
“Montana exceptions” recognizing such powers.15 Despite the Montana Court’s 
certainty that tribes retain certain powers over non-Indians, even on non-Indian 
owned fee land, the Court’s reliance on this test has resulted in recognizing such 
authority in only one very limited capacity in the intervening four decades.16 
Thus, while far removed for foundational notions of tribal territories as distinct 
communities over which a state could have no authority, the intertwined questions 
of whether a state (analyzed under a preemption analysis) or a tribe (analyzed under 
 
11 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
12 Id. at 559 n. 9. 
13 Id. at 565. 
14 Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted). 
15 See, e.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 329-30 
(2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 353, 358-59 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 
438, 445-48 (1997); see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2502 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 





Montana and its progeny) can exercise particular powers have evolved into 
complicated, fact-specific legal questions. 
B. Other Sources of Tribal Authority 
In addition to the evolution of Supreme Court precedent regarding state and tribal 
regulatory authority, Congress remains free to define the nature and extent of tribal 
and state power in Indian Country.  
First, Congress retains authority to both recognize tribal sovereignty and delegate to 
tribes additional authority under federal law.17 It has done both through 
amendments to a suite of bedrock environmental laws by authorizing tribes to 
assume primacy across their reservations for purposes of implementing and 
enforcing those laws.18 Importantly, after Congress did so in changes to the Clean 
Water Act (CWA), the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
initially interpreted that action as a recognition of tribal sovereignty and required 
tribes to demonstrate inherent authority (pursuant to Montana) in order to exercise 
those powers.19 For a variety of reasons, however, the USEPA has subsequently 
reinterpreted the CWA as a delegation of federal power, which obviates the need for 
any Montana analysis.20 
Second, although the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the rights reserved 
by tribes through treaties with the United States when considering the effects of 
allotment and applying Montana, those reserved rights remain important bases for 
tribal activities and powers. The Supreme Court applies particular rules, known as 
the Indian canons of construction, when interpreting treaty reserved rights and, as 
the Court found in McGirt, these rules require that such rights be insulated from 
diminishment unless Congress has expressly indicated an intent to do so.21 In 
addition to McGirt, a spate of recent cases upholding the continuing existence and 
exercise of these reserved rights beyond reservation boundaries suggests that the 
modern Court is committed to adhering to the canons of construction when 
analyzing treaty rights and authorities going forward.22 
Third, for over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized and protected tribal 
rights to water appurtenant to and necessary to fulfill the purposes of their 
reservations. These rights, first determined by the Court in its 1908 decision United 
 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Lara. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
18 See Tribal Assumption of Federal Laws – Treatment as a State (TAS), UNITED STATES 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribal-assumption-federal-
laws-treatment-state-tas (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).  
19 See, e.g., State of Montana v. United States Envt’l Protection Agency, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
20 Environmental Protection Agency, Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal 
Provision, 81 Fed. Reg. 30,183 (May 16, 2016). 
21 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
22 See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc., 139 S.Ct. 1000 (2019); 




States v. Winters,23 establish a federal law basis for tribal claims to water. 
Furthermore, although subsequent federal law subjects those claims to adjudication 
by state courts,24 their origin in the Congressional acts and treaties setting aside 
tribal homelands often ensure they remain senior to claims by competing water 
users. Finally, by virtue of their federal status, these rights need not comply with 
state law in all respects.25 As a result, the unique status of tribal water rights provide 
an additional source of tribal power that often requires additional analysis beyond 
the general assessment of jurisdictional boundaries described above. 
C. Oklahoma 
The preceding overview of federal Indian law is necessary to understand the general 
framework within which issues specific to eastern Oklahoma arise. The unique 
history of the Five Tribes and various aspects of their relations with both the United 
States and the State of Oklahoma are also critical to assessing the challenges and 
opportunities posed by McGirt in the areas of environmental regulation and natural 
resources. While a detailed historical review is beyond the scope of this paper,26 the 
following examples, rooted in treaties and federal laws specific to the Five Tribes and 
Oklahoma, are particularly relevant and demonstrate the need to carefully analyze 
these unique contexts when considering otherwise applicable principles of federal 
Indian law. 
As recognized by Justice Gorsuch’s opinion for the majority in McGirt, the present-
day jurisdictional conflicts are rooted in the evolution of law and policy developed 
by and foisted upon the Five Tribes. Particularly relevant to the McGirt decision, for 
example, were treaties entered between the United States and the Creek Nation in 
the early 1830s, pursuant to which the United States secured the removal of the 
Nation in exchange for a “‘permanent home to the whole Creek nation,” … [and a] 
promise[ ] that “[no] State or Territory [shall] ever have a right to pass laws for the 
government of such Indians, but they shall be allowed to govern themselves.’”27 
Similar guarantees or promises of land were made to the other four of the Five 
Tribes.28  
As with the question of criminal jurisdiction posed in McGirt, the terms of these and 
subsequent treaties reserving and protecting lands and reservations for the Five 
 
23 207 U.S. 564 (1908) 
24 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2016). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1324, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1983). 
26 Most readers are likely intimately familiar with this history; however, for additional 
background and resources, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, §4.07[1][a] at 288-
310 (Nell Jessup Newton, ed. 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
27 140 S. Ct. at 2459 (citing Treaty with the Creeks, preamble, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 418 
(1833 Treaty); Treaty with the Creeks, Art. XIV, Mar. 24, 1832, 7 Stat. 366, 368 (1832 
Treaty)). 
28 See, e.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, art. V, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, 481; Treaty with 
the Choctaws, art. 4, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333, 333-34; Treaty with the Seminoles, March 




Tribes have been critical in resolving disputes over ownership of and jurisdiction over 
natural resources. In Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, for example, the United States 
Supreme Court relied on these treaty promises to the Cherokee, Choctaw, and 
Chickasaw to find that the bed and banks of certain navigable waterways passing 
through those lands—property that would have otherwise passed to the State of 
Oklahoma upon statehood—was granted to and remained in tribal ownership.29 That 
result, rooted in these specific treaties, was starkly different than the Court’s 
decision in Montana that similar property had not been reserved by the Crow Tribe 
and, instead, had transferred to the State of Montana upon statehood.30 Thus, while 
the general principles of federal Indian law may be relevant, tribal-specific histories 
and treaty language are also critical to any legal issue arising in Indian Country. 
The history of allotment in what would become Oklahoma is also important to 
understanding and analyzing the post-McGirt landscape. The federal government 
pursued allotment of the Five Tribes’ territories in a manner consistent with the 
general allotment policy prescribed by the General Allotment Act of 1887 but, unlike 
other reservations across much of the country, the territories of the Five Tribes were 
excluded from that law.31 Instead, Congress passed additional legislation specific to 
the allotment of these tribal lands, including the Curtis Act in 1898, which authorized 
allotment generally,32 and subsequent tribe-specific implementing legislation.33 
Ultimately, while the Five Tribes and their members have fought to retain individual 
allotments, tribal trust lands, and other parcels owned in restricted fee status, the 
allotment of their lands resulted in a significant diminution of tribal- and tribal 
member-owned lands within their reservations.34 The resulting patterns of 
ownership within the reservations of the Five Tribes include lands retained by the 
Tribes since their original treaty guarantees,35 lands allotted to individual tribal 
members that, whether formally restricted or not, remain owned by the heirs of the 
 
29 397 U.S. 620, 628-31 (1970).  
30 Montana, 450 U.S. at 555 n. 5 (distinguishing the history of removal of the Five Tribes and 
the grants of property to them in fee status from the relevant Crow treaties and history). 
31 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, § 8, 24 Stat. 391, codified at 25 U.S.C. §339 (2016). 
32 Act of June 28, 1898, § 11, 30 Stat. 495, 497; see also McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2465 
(discussing the Curtis Act in the context of jurisdiction). 
33 See, e.g., An Act to Ratify and Confirm an Agreement with the Muscogee or Creek tribe of 
Indians and for other purposes, March 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861, 862-64.  
34 Five Civilized Tribes Allotted Lands, Cherokee Nation GIS doc. no. 4551c (Mar. 1, 2016). 
Copy available in author’s files. Importantly, the trust and restricted fee lands retained or 
acquired by the Five Tribes within reservation boundaries remained Indian Country 
pursuant to federal law regardless of the McGirt decision and recent decisions have 
recognized the same for individually owned trust or restricted fee allotments. COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, §4.07[1][b] at 292-94. Thus, the fundamental challenge and possibility posed by 
McGirt is the recognition that all of those lands lost through allotment remain Indian 
Country and are now subject to broader tribal powers.  
35 See, e.g., Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d 967, 976 (10th Cir. 1987) 
(analyzing one parcel of land held by the Creek Nation and finding that, “with title dating 
back to treaties concluded in the 1830s and patents issued in the 1850s,” such land is the 




original allottee and for which “title … can be traced directly to the Reservation(s) 
granted to [a Tribe] … and [that were] never owned by the State of Oklahoma,”36 and 
lands that have passed entirely out of tribal or tribal citizen ownership.37 
The loss of tribal- and tribal member-owned lands was compounded after allotment 
by additional Congressional legislation addressing the alienability of individual 
allotments or parcels of restricted fee lands and expanding Oklahoma’s authority 
over the transfer and management of those parcels.38 The Stigler Act of 1947, for 
example, limited who could acquire such interests,39 authorized state court 
jurisdiction over guardianship, estate, and probate proceedings for members of the 
Five Tribes,40 and limited the tax exempt status of those lands.41 Each of these actions 
terminated otherwise applicable federal law protections for those interests and, as 
a result, trust and restricted allotments continued to pass from tribal hands into non-
Indian ownership.42 In addition, as discussed in greater detail below, the Stigler Act 
also authorized state regulatory authority over oil and gas operations on the Tribes’ 
restricted lands, although such authority did not explicitly displace any concurrent 
tribal powers and remained subject to federal oversight.43  
Finally, even more recent federal legislation focused on the balance of federal, tribal, 
and state authorities within the boundaries of Oklahoma may also be relevant. In 
2005, for example, Congress required the USEPA to approve an extension of the 
State’s regulatory programs into Indian Country upon Oklahoma’s request and 
required the State’s agreement as a precondition to the assumption of such 
responsibilities by any Tribe.44 As a result of this provision, unlike elsewhere in Indian 
Country, the Five Tribes must reach agreement with Oklahoma in order to be 
delegated federal authority from USEPA.45 In addition, by virtue of recent, post-
McGirt approval from the USEPA Administrator pursuant to this law, Oklahoma 
 
36 See, e.g., Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 6, Bosse v. State of Oklahoma, Case No. 
CF-2010-213; PCD-2019-124 (Mclain Cty. Dist. Ct. filed Oct. 13, 2020) 
37 See also D. Faith Olowski and Robbie Emory Burke, Oklahoma Indian Titles, 29 TULSA L. J. 
361, 363-67 (2013). 
38 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. 731 (The Stigler Act).  
39 Id. at Sec. 1-2, 61 Stat. 731-32. 
40 Id. at Sec. 3, 61 Stat. 732. 
41 Id. at Sec. 6, 61 Stat. 733. 
42 Congress recently amended the law to eliminate the limitations on who could acquire 
trust and restricted allotments. See Act of Dec. 31, 2018, Pub. L. 115-399, 132 Stat. 5331.  
43 Act of Aug. 4, 1947, Sec. 11, 61 Stat. 731, 734 (“All restricted lands of the Five Civilized 
Tribes are hereby made subject to all oil and gas conservation laws of Oklahoma; Provided, 
That no order of the Corporation Commission affecting restricted Indian land shall be valid 
as to such land until submitted to and approved by the Secretary of the Interior or his duly 
authorized representative.”) 
44 The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users 
(SAFETEA-LU), Aug. 10, 2005, Sec. 10211, Pub. L. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144, 1937.  




continues to exercise broad environmental regulatory authority across the Five 
Tribes’ reservations.46 
These examples are particularly relevant for the specific subject matter areas that 
follow but, more broadly, emphasize the need for careful scrutiny of the potential 
for unique legal issues related to the Five Tribes within the broader context of federal 
Indian law. With that approach in mind, the remainder of this paper focuses on 
environmental regulation, with a specific emphasis on oil and gas development; 
natural resources management, with a specific focus on hunting and fishing; and the 
management of water and water rights. 
Environmental Regulation. 
The authority to regulate and protect the environment within Indian Country is 
primarily governed by two intersecting and overarching legal tests. First, as described 
above, the general rules of civil regulatory authority authored by the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court provide the basis for determining whether a tribal or 
state government can adopt and enforce environmental laws and regulations. 
Second, a suite of federal environmental protection laws authorize the USEPA or, if 
approved by the USEPA, either a tribe or state, to develop, implement, and enforce 
various environmental rules, including those related to air and water quality and a 
host of other issues.47 These two primary standards for analyzing and assessing 
environmental regulatory authority in Indian Country are often fact-bound and 
complex, requiring an understanding of the specific parties, land, and activity over 
which such authority is being asserted. Therefore, this section addresses these issues 
by utilizing the specific example of oil and gas development in a post-McGirt eastern 
Oklahoma to help guide the discussion. 
A. Oil and Gas Development in Indian Country and Oklahoma. 
The regulation of oil and gas activity requires a host of interrelated or sequential 
actions, from spacing, pooling, and communitization rules and regulations to the 
enforcement of health and safety standards during development to the plugging and 
abandonment of previously developed wells. The protection and regulation of water 
 
46 Letter from USEPA Administrator Wheeler to Governor J. Kevin Stitt, Re: Approval of State 
of Oklahoma Request Under Section 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act of 2005 (Oct. 1, 2020), available at 
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/epa-letter-to-gov.-stitt.pdf [hereinafter 
Wheeler letter]. 




and air quality from discharges or pollution during such development are also critical 
elements of such authority.48  
In most instances across Indian Country, the federal government plays an integral 
role in these activities by virtue of its trust responsibility and ownership (for the 
benefit of tribes) of significant surface and mineral interests. Under federal law, 
therefore, various federal agencies are responsible for the leasing, regulation, and 
oversight of oil and gas development on such lands.49 In addition, many tribes on 
whose reservations oil and gas development is prevalent have adopted their own 
legal and regulatory structure to support those federal agencies, whether through 
tribal regulatory processes necessary prior to the federal approval of a lease or other 
decision or tribal codes addressing other related environmental protections.50 A 
number of tribes, including the Cherokee Nation, have also sought the delegation of 
additional authority from the USEPA under various federal environmental laws 
authorizing such delegations.51 The combination of federal and tribal oversight of oil 
and gas development along with tribal environmental laws and protections, 
including those relying on delegated federal authority, provide a broad basis of 
federal and tribal regulatory authority on many reservations. 
Conversely, prior to McGirt, the State of Oklahoma exercised authority over the bulk 
of these activities across all of eastern Oklahoma. For example, pursuant to the 
Stigler Act described above, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission exercised 
concurrent authority over the leasing, spacing, communitization, and 
decommissioning of wells on certain restricted lands within the Five Tribes’ 
reservations.52 As noted by the text of that law, the exercise of that authority is in 
conjunction with the federal government’s authority, and the federal government 
retains leasing and regulatory authority over those and other restricted or trust lands 
of the Five Tribes as well.53  
 
48 Although oil and gas development is a discrete example intended to illustrate and apply 
the broader concepts relevant to environmental regulation, the potential environmental 
impacts occasioned by such development could be extrapolated to other activities. Also, 
this briefing paper does not consider the authority to levy taxes on oil and gas activity, 
which is addressed in a separate briefing paper in this series. 
49 See, e.g., 25 C.F.R part 211 (2020).  
50 See, e.g., MHA Energy, MANDAN, HIDATSA AND ARIKARA NATION, 
https://www.mhanation.com/mha-energy (last visited Nov. 27, 2020); Southern Ute 
Department of Energy, SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE, www.suitdoe.com (last visited Dec. 1, 
2020).  
51 Tribes Approved for Treatment as a State (TAS), UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/tribal/tribes-approved-treatment-state-tas (last visited Dec. 1, 2020).  
52 Act of Aug. 4, 1947, 61 Stat. at 734; Currey v. Corp. Comm’n, 617 P.2d 177 (Okla. 1979), 
cert den. 452 U.S. 938, reh. den. 453 U.S. 927 (1981) (upholding state authority to order the 
plugging of wells on restricted lands). 
53 See, e.g., Leasing of Restricted Lands of Members of Five Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma, For 




In addition, in 2013, the Muscogee Creek Nation—expressing a desire to improve 
upon the federal government’s regulatory activities—adopted its own tribal law to 
regulate oil and gas activities as well.54 Other of the Five Tribes have also adopted 
their own environmental laws and developed environmental programs in an effort 
to protect their trust and restricted resources as well as their citizens and 
communities.55 
But, despite those potentially concurrent federal and tribal standards, the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission has been the primary regulator of oil and gas activity within 
the Five Tribes’ reservations, even to the detriment of the federal government’s 
regulatory authority.56 In addition, since the USEPA Administrator’s approval of 
Oklahoma’s petition to extend its delegated environmental authority into the Five 
Tribes’ reservation boundaries after McGirt, the State continues to exercise 
environmental regulatory authority on essentially the same basis as it did prior to 
that decision.57 
So, what opportunities for reform or improvement are presented by a post-McGirt 
world? 
 
54 Muscogee (Creek) Nation N.C.A. 13-266, available at 
https://www.creeksupremecourt.com/wp-content/uploads/T43-NCA13-266.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2020).  
55 See, e.g., Cherokee Nation Environmental Programs, CHEROKEE NATION, 
https://www.cherokee.org/our-government/secretary-of-natural-resources-
office/environmental-programs/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2020).  
56 See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson, Pooling, Communitization & Unit Formation: State 
Conservation Regulation – Single Well Spacing and Pooling – vis a vis Federal and Indian 
Lands, Appx. A, 2006 NO. 4 RMMLF-INST PAPER NO. 2 (“The OCC [Oklahoma Corporation 
Commission] has not been delegated authority to regulate oil and gas development on the 
trust allotted lands or to apply the conservation laws to such lands. Thus, exclusive 
regulatory authority exists within BLM and BIA for the trust allotments. However, in 
practice, due to the mixed ownership of non-Indian and Indian lands in trust allotments in 
Oklahoma, the OCC routinely establishes drilling and spacing units that either include or de-
space Indian trust lands, regardless of whether the Indian lands have been leased by the 
Department.”) 
57 See Wheeler Letter, supra n. 46; United States Environmental Protection Agency, 
Summary Report of Tribal Consultation and Engagement Related to the State of Oklahoma’s 
Request to Implement Regulatory Programs in Certain Areas of Indian Country in 
Accordance with Section 10211(a) of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation 
Equity Act of 2005: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA), 9 (Sept. 29, 2020) (“Generally speaking, 
following approval of the State’s request, the geographic and programmatic scope of 
Oklahoma’s regulatory programs will not change from that which existed, as a practical 
matter, prior to the McGirt decision…In addition, EPA’s approval is not intended to affect 
any authority that a tribe or EPA may have on Tribal Trust lands, allotments, or treaty fee 
lands. Nor is EPA’s approval intended to address any aspect of any tribe’s authority based 
on tribal law outside the scope of any statute administered by EPA. EPA’s decision under 
SAFETEA will generally not affect EPA’s direct implementation of programs on trust lands, 




B. Post-McGirt Opportunities and Risks. 
As described above, Indian tribes retain broad power over their lands and members 
within Indian Country and assertions of state power over tribes, their lands or 
members within Indian Country are, as a general matter, per se invalid unless 
authorized by Congress.58 Therefore, with the Supreme Court’s recognition that the 
Five Tribes’ reservation boundaries remain, this broad tribal authority and exclusion 
of state authority extends to those boundaries, and includes tribal power over 
members who may be engaging in activities on non-Indian owned lands.  
Beyond the activities of tribal members, the Supreme Court’s Montana test, 
including its general rule and two exceptions, has become the guiding legal principle 
for determining whether one of the Five Tribes can exercise regulatory control over 
non-tribal members on non-Indian owned lands in Indian Country. But, by virtue of 
the unique history of Oklahoma, including the various Congressional enactments 
related to tribal lands, allotments, and restricted status lands, even determining the 
nature of ownership of a particular parcel may be challenging. Unlike in Montana, 
where the Supreme Court determined that the Crow Tribe lacked any claim to the 
lands at issue, the Five Tribes retain treaty-guaranteed lands—the “purest form of 
Indian Country”59—and could potentially assert broader authority, conditioned on 
the continuing right to exclude state oversight, over other lands where title has 
remained in tribal member ownership and could be traced directly to those original 
treaty promises.60 Thus, application of Montana’s general rule limiting tribal 
authority is not as straightforward in Oklahoma. 
On non-member owned fee lands, however, Montana’s general rule does apply and 
tribal authority over a non-member on non-Indian lands is generally disfavored. In 
those situations, a tribe must be able to show a consensual relationship with the 
non-member or that the non-member’s activities pose a threat or may have an effect 
on the tribe’s interests, health, safety, or welfare in order to exercise regulatory 
authority.61 The nature of oil and gas development and its corresponding 
environmental risks would seem to provide a strong basis for tribal authority under 
this second Montana exception; however, while some lower courts have been open 
to such claims,62 the Supreme Court has interpreted that exception very narrowly 
and suggested that only a catastrophic threat or effect would suffice.63 Even if able 
 
58 McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168; California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 
214-15; but see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976) 
(upholding as a “minimal burden” a state requirement that Tribes collect taxes from sales to 
non-Indians). 
59 Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma, 829 F.2d at 976. 
60 Cf. Montana, 450 U.S. at 561 (addressing the alienation of lands from tribal ownership to 
non-member fee ownership). 
61 Montana, 490 U.S. at 565-66. 
62 See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 942 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2019); Attorney’s 
Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox Tribe of Miss. in Iowa, 609 F.3d 927, 939 
(8th Cir. 2010) 




to meet that high standard, doing so would depend upon the specific facts at issue 
and likely not provide a broader base of authority necessary for tribal regulatory 
authority across all similarly situated actors within the reservation. 
Conversely, although Congress has expressly authorized Oklahoma’s authority over 
certain oil and gas and environmental regulatory activities, the State may still need 
to demonstrate that its authority to regulate elsewhere in Indian Country does not 
infringe upon tribal sovereignty and is not pre-empted under the applicable interest 
analysis described above.64 As in the Supreme Court’s analysis of these factors in its 
Cotton Petroleum and Mescalero Apache Tribe decisions, the outcome would likely 
turn upon the nature of the state’s interests in exercising that authority and whether 
such state authority would frustrate competing federal and tribal interests. In Cotton 
Petroleum, for example, the Court found it persuasive that the State of New Mexico 
was directly involved in and supportive of non-Indian oil and gas development 
activity in Indian Country.65  
While impossible to predict the outcome of any specific conflict, it seems likely that 
similar reasoning would be quite persuasive in any dispute over Oklahoma’s 
regulatory authority over non-Indians on non-Indian owned land within the Five 
Tribes’ reservations, particularly given the history of Oklahoma’s extensive 
involvement in environmental regulation and oversight of oil and gas activity and 
Congressional expansions of that authority in the Stigler Act and SAFETEA-LU. As with 
arguments around tribal authority under Montana, however, these cases and their 
resolution may be limited to specific facts and circumstances without providing many 
broad, reliable answers to either the Five Tribes or the State of Oklahoma.66 In fact, 
where any such conflict may arise, the specific history, chain of title, and ownership 
of each parcel of land involved as well as the identity of the parties at issue are likely 
to determine the specific boundaries of tribal and state authority. Even where those 
boundaries are clearly defined in favor of state or tribal authority in a specific 
instance, however, both sovereigns are likely to share authority on a more regional 
or reservation-wide basis. And, even if the State or a tribe may have strong 
 
64 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, at § 6.03[2][c], 528-29 (“State jurisdiction and tribal 
jurisdiction in Indian country raise two separate legal questions. For example, if application 
of the Montana test results in a finding that a tribe lacks jurisdiction over a non-Indian on 
non-Indian land in Indian country, it does not necessarily follow that the state can enter 
Indian country and impose its laws by … controlling the non-Indian behavior.”) 
65 490 U.S. 163, 185-87 (“This is not a case in which the State has had nothing to do with the 
on-reservation activity, save tax it.”) 
66 At least one producer has already challenged the OCC’s authority over its operations 
within Indian Country. See Decision Sheet of the ALJ, Applicant Calyx Energy III, LLC, Cause 
Nos. CD 202001032 through 202001042, Before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission 
(Aug. 4, 2020). On November 25, 2020, the OCC, relying on the Stigler Act and the general 
rule of Montana, rejected that challenge. Order Denying Protestant’s Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Jurisdiction and Oral Motion to Stay, Applicant Calyx Energy III, LLC, Cause Nos. CD 
202001032 through 202001042, Before the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (Nov. 25, 




arguments in its favor, the uncertainty, cost, and delay associated with securing a 
confirmation of such authority present a dilemma for policy-makers and regulators.  
Faced with similar dilemmas and interested in avoiding all-or-nothing jurisdictional 
fights, other tribes have developed innovative approaches to oil and gas and 
environmental regulation within their reservation boundaries. On the Southern Ute 
Indian Reservation in Southwestern Colorado, for example, the jurisdictional 
situation is similarly complicated by history, allotment, and conflict between the 
Tribe and the State of Colorado. But, in hopes of providing some certainty and 
avoiding protracted litigation and uncertainty, the Tribe and its allies persuaded 
Congress to enact a law confirming some of the jurisdictional divides within the 
Reservation’s boundaries.67  
While that legislation limited tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians to the Tribe’s trust 
lands,68 it did not resolve the complex situation of state, federal, and tribal regulation 
of the development of oil and gas from the various parcels of surface and sub-surface 
interests within the Reservation. In an effort to establish guidelines between those 
three governments for those regulatory activities, the Tribe, the federal government, 
and the State oil and gas regulatory body negotiated and entered an 
intergovernmental agreement pursuant to which the parties agreed to disagree 
about the extent of their respective authorities but consented to a process for 
acknowledging and confirming appropriately rendered decisions of the relevant 
state regulatory body.69 Similar intergovernmental agreements address the balance 
of regulatory authority on Indian lands and provide a common basis for 
communication while reducing potentially duplicative regulatory requirements,70 an 
issue already identified as an existing challenge for certain restricted status lands in 
 
67 Pub. L. 98-290, 98 Stat. 201 (May 21, 1984), codified at 25 U.S.C. § 668 notes.  
68 Id.  
69 See Section D.4, INTERAGENCY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (Southern Ute 
Indian Tribe and Bureau of Land Management) AND INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT (Bureau of 
Indian Affairs and Bureau of Land Management) attached to Anderson, supra n. 56 at Appx. 
C (“It is the Tribe's position that the COGCC lacks the jurisdiction to issue an order or 
decision affecting Indian lands within the boundaries of the Southern Ute Indian 
Reservation. Pursuant to an MOU between the BLM and the COGCC, BLM has contracted 
with the state to conduct hearings and review matters affecting Indian lands, and to make 
decisions affecting Indian lands. Without the concurrence of the parties hereto to decisions 
rendered by the COGCC affecting Indian lands, the parties agree that the COGCC by itself 
lacks the jurisdiction to render such decisions. This Agreement is intended to provide an 
acceptable procedure for obtaining the concurrence of the parties needed to make any 
COGCC decision binding. Should the COGCC render a decision or order after the parties 
have followed the approved procedures contained in this Agreement, said COGCC decision 
shall be deemed by the parties hereto to be a decision of the BLM. Any interested party 
shall have the same opportunity to appeal or challenge such decision as if said decision had 
been rendered exclusively by the BLM, Colorado State Director.”) 




eastern Oklahoma.71 With that common basis, then, the Southern Ute Indian Tribe 
worked to develop its own regulatory capacity and authority to complement that of 
its fellow governmental partners.72 
In addition, facing similar potential for conflicts and litigation, the Southern Ute 
Indian Tribe also developed an innovative approach to environmental regulation. 
Working with the State of Colorado, the Tribe “established a six-member 
environmental commission to promulgate rules and regulation for reservation air 
quality.”73 The intergovernmental agreement to do so envisioned a long-term 
collaborative effort to build an air quality program to cover the entire Reservation 
and, ultimately, resulted in the Tribe applying for and being granted authority from 
the USEPA to administer and regulate air quality, subject to the oversight and 
authority of the intergovernmental environmental commission.74 As a result, while 
the process of establishing the commission and developing its technical capacity has 
taken decades, both the Tribe and the State of Colorado are now able to work 
cooperatively to protect the local environment for all of their citizens. 
The Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) in Arizona is another example of tribal efforts 
to regulate the environment despite jurisdictional complexities. Like Southern Ute, 
the GRIC worked to develop a comprehensive air quality management plan and 
engaged in a long-term effort to educate and consult with neighboring communities 
and non-tribal reservation residents about the GRIC’s plan and efforts to protect air 
quality.75 The GRIC also secured treatment-as-state status from USEPA but did not 
initially have confirmed authority to levy penalties and enforce them upon non-tribal 
operators on the reservation. Nonetheless, the GRIC’s educational and collaborative 
efforts preempted any jurisdictional challenges to those early enforcement 
activities.76  
The lessons offered by Southern Ute and GRIC demonstrate the potential benefits of 
long-term cooperative efforts to regulate the environment, particularly for resources 
 
71 See id. at Appx. A (“…companies have advised the BLM that they believe development of 
Indian trust lands in Oklahoma is cost prohibitive because of dual permitting requirements 
imposed by the BLM and OCC.”) 
72 See Southern Ute Department of Energy, supra n. 50. 
73 Sarah L. Hicks, Intergovernmental Relationships: Expressions of Tribal Sovereignty in 
Rebuilding Native Nations: Strategies for Governance and Development, 248 (Miriam 
Jorgensen, ed. 2007); see also https://www.southernute-nsn.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/15/2018/04/Intergovernmental-Agreement_IGA.pdf.  
74 See 76 Fed. Reg. 12,925 (Mar. 9, 2011). 
75 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, HONORING NATIONS: 
2010 Honoree; Air Quality Program – Gila River Indian Community, 2-3, 
https://hpaied.org/sites/default/files/publications/air%20quality%20program.pdf.  
76 Id. at 3 (“Although formal federal enforceability was still pending at the time of these 
sanctions, there were no legal challenges to the community’s air quality enforcement 
authority. This acceptance is a tribute to the tribal government’s openness to working with 
stakeholders, as well as its willingness to cooperate with other governments, and to 




that could result in permanent impacts across jurisdictional boundaries, like oil and 
gas development and air and water quality. While the possibility of negotiating and 
entering cooperative agreements to address oil and gas or broader environmental 
regulations presents a daunting challenge, the fact-specific and limited nature of 
Supreme Court precedent and potential litigation may result in similar delays while 
still resulting in continued uncertainty.  
Natural Resources (Hunting and Fishing) 
The complexities associated with environmental regulation mirror those relevant to 
the management of natural resources more broadly, including the conservation of 
fish and wildlife and the control of hunting and fishing in Indian Country. As with the 
analyses of state and tribal authority described in the previous section, tribes 
generally retain broad authority over their members and resources while the 
Montana test governs tribal authority over non-tribal members on non-Indian 
owned lands. Similarly, as demonstrated by New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,77 
state authority over non-Indian hunting and fishing within Indian Country is analyzed 
by applying the preemption framework.78 Thus, post-McGirt, tribal authority over 
tribal members now extends to the exterior boundaries of the Five Tribes’ 
Reservations and, if litigated, the legal standards for determining tribal or state 
authority over non-tribal members on non-Indian owned lands within those 
boundaries depend upon facts and contexts specific to individuals and lands 
involved. Therefore, as with tribal authority to regulate the environment, the 
prevailing narrow view of tribal authority over non-tribal members combined with 
the long history of state control over much of this territory may undermine efforts 
of the Five Tribes to secure judicial affirmation of their inherent sovereign power to 
regulate the use of natural resources by any user anywhere within their 
Reservations.79 
Prior to McGirt, the Cherokee and Choctaw Nations developed intergovernmental 
agreements with the State of Oklahoma to provide a basis on which the citizens of 
each Nation could secure hunting and fishing licenses and upon which each Nation 
could work cooperatively with Oklahoma to “effectively manage their respective and 
 
77 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 
78 See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). 
79 The Muscogee (Creek) Nation noted these limitations in its amicus briefing to the 
Supreme Court in both McGirt and its predecessor case. See Brief for Amicus Curiae 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation in Support of Petitioner, McGirt v. Oklahoma, No. 18-9526, 43 
(filed Feb. 11, 2020) (“This Court's precedents render hollow any claims of civil legal 
disruption as they presumptively constrain the exercise of tribal authority over non-Indians 
on fee lands (in areas ranging from regulation to taxation to adjudication) while providing 
that the corollary state authority remains intact.”); Brief for Amicus Curiae Muscogee 





shared resources.”80 While the specific terms and implementation of each of those 
compacts differ slightly, both seek to ensure a comprehensive legal and regulatory 
scheme for tribal citizens to hunt and fish while recognizing the unique history and 
jurisdictional complexities of the Cherokee and Choctaw lands and reservations. The 
tribal nations agreed in both compacts to purchase state licenses for their citizens 
and to enact legislation consistent with relevant federal laws and comparable to 
Oklahoma’s hunting and fishing standards in order to maintain consistency and 
comprehensive protections for fish and wildlife.81  
Importantly, both Compacts include broad definitions of tribal authority. The 
Cherokee Nation’s Compact generally refers to “to the lands, waters, fish, wildlife 
and persons subject to the jurisdiction of the Nation,”82 while the Choctaw Nation’s 
Compact also specifically defines those lands as “including those lands defined as 
‘Indian country’ per 18 U.S.C. § 1151.”83 Thus, post-McGirt, the tribal nations and 
Oklahoma could continue to rely upon the terms of these compacts to govern the 
regulation of hunting and fishing for tribal citizens anywhere within the exterior 
boundaries of the Cherokee and Choctaw Reservations without the need for further 
amendment or modification.  
But, while these Compacts provide a solid foundation on which to proceed, both 
Cherokee and Choctaw—as well as other of the Five Tribes—may wish to revisit the 
balance of tribal and state authority represented in those agreements in light of 
McGirt. At the very least, for example, the Five Tribes and Oklahoma may need to 
reconsider how to effectively regulate and oversee tribal citizens hunting and fishing 
within the exterior boundaries of the Five Tribes’ reservations, particularly in light of 
the general rule limiting state power over tribes and their members in Indian 
Country. Beyond that issue, the Five Tribes and the State of Oklahoma may also want 
to consider the regulation of non-tribal members as well as their collective interests 
in the conservation and management of shared resources like fish and wildlife. If so, 
lessons and examples from elsewhere in Indian Country may be helpful for those 
discussions. 
The Flathead Reservation of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) in 
Montana is highly checkerboarded and predominantly populated by non-tribal 
members owning fee property.84 With regard to the regulation of hunting and 
 
80 Hunting and Fishing Compact between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Oklahoma, 
Art. 1 (May 29, 2015) available at https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/90614.pdf 
[hereinafter Cherokee Compact]; see also Hunting and Fishing Compact between the 
Choctaw Nation and the State of Oklahoma (Aug. 31, 2016), available at 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/filelog/91317.pdf [hereinafter Choctaw Compact]. 
81 See Cherokee Compact, at Art. II; Choctaw Compact, at Art. II. 
82 Cherokee Compact, at Art. II(1)(b). 
83 Choctaw Compact, at Art. II(1)(a) n. 1. 
84 See Land Status 2020, Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead 
Reservation, 
https://csktribes.org/component/rsfiles/preview?path=NRD%252Fpublic_landstatusCSKT_8




fishing, however, the CSKT retain important rights they reserved in the 1855 Treaty 
of Hellgate, which established the reservation, including the “exclusive right of taking 
fish in all streams running through or bordering said reservation.”85  
Despite that strong, treaty-based right to exclusivity, however, the CSKT and the 
State of Montana engaged in lengthy litigation over the nature and extent of the 
Tribes’ right to regulate all hunting and fishing (by both tribal members and non-
members) across the Flathead Reservation.86 Based on this treaty language, 
however, the CSKT were able establish their ownership of submerged lands 
underlying an important lake on the Reservation and, from that basis of ownership, 
distinguish Montana and secure broader regulatory authority, even over non-tribal 
members.87  
The Tribes then leveraged that authority into regulatory standards that they sought 
to apply across the Reservation and began negotiations with the State of Montana 
to secure an agreement for doing so.88 Spurred on by additional litigation supporting 
the tribal position,89 the State and the Tribes entered into an intergovernmental 
agreement regarding hunting and fishing on the Flathead Reservation. 
The terms of the State-Tribal Cooperative Agreement Between The Confederated 
Salish and Kootenai Tribes of The Flathead Reservation and The State of Montana by 
and through the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks of The State of Montana 
provide for a joint state-tribal wildlife board, the purpose of which is to develop 
“cooperative management plans which include fishing and bird hunting 
regulations.”90 The board is composed of a mix of tribal and state representatives 
and has the authority to establish technical committees to develop and recommend 
 
85 The Treaty of Hellgate of July 16, 1855, 12 Stat. 975. The Treaty of Hellgate also expressly 
reserved to the Tribes significant rights beyond the boundaries of that reservation. See id. 
at art. III, 12 Stat. 976. Although the Five Tribes’ treaties do not include similar express 
reservations, a detailed analysis of whether the Tribes retain other treaty-reserved off-
reservation rights is beyond the scope of this briefing paper. See, e.g., art. XII, Treaty with 
the Creek Indians, 14 Stat. 785, 790, June 14, 1866 (reaffirming all “treaty obligations” of 
the United States from treaties entered into with the Creek Nation prior to 1861).  
86 See Jason Williams, Beyond Mere Ownership: How the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes used Regulatory Control over Natural Resources to Establish a Viable Homeland, 24 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 121, 124-33 (2004) 
87 Id. at 125-129; Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 380 F. Supp. 452,(D. 
Mont. 1974); Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. 
Namen, 665 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1982). 
88 Williams, supra n. 86, at 131-32. 
89 Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 750 F. Supp. 446 (D. Mont. 1990). 
90 State-Tribal Cooperative Agreement Between the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribes of The Flathead Reservation and the State of Montana by and through the 
Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks of The State Of Montana, available at 
http://fwp.mt.gov/fwpDoc.html?id=46515 (this 2010 public review version was adopted 




regulatory approaches.91 Once the joint board adopts proposed regulations, those 
proposals are forwarded to both the CKST Tribal Council and Montana Fish and 
Wildlife Commission for final approval and adoption.92  
The agreement includes specifics regarding enforcement of duly adopted hunting 
and fishing regulations as well as licensing procedures for authorizing individuals to 
hunt and fish on the Flathead Reservation.93 The enforcement procedures include 
cross-deputization of tribal and state wildlife officers and provide further 
opportunities for collaborative training and cross-jurisdictional support.94 Those 
procedures dictate standards for uniform regulatory enforcement and require the 
citation of tribal members and any violations occurring on Indian lands into tribal 
court, while alleged violations committed by non-members on non-Indian lands are 
cited into state court.95 Any revenues generated by either license fees or 
enforcement actions are then deposited with the CSKT and earmarked for their fish 
and wildlife conservation program.96 
Importantly, neither the CSKT nor the State acknowledge any diminution of their 
regulatory authority; rather, the cooperative agreement represents a bilateral 
process for exercising shared authority while each party agrees to disagree about the 
precise scope of its power.97 And, despite decades of litigation preceding the 
cooperative agreement, it remains a solid and practical basis for workable joint 
regulation of hunting and fishing across the Flathead Reservation.98 
Beyond on-reservation hunting and fishing, a number of tribes also engage in the 
management of off-reservation, treaty-reserved rights and resources that also 
demand collaborative approaches with local states and the federal government. Of 
these, the longest standing and most well-established are intertribal coalitions 
organized to manage and conserve treaty-related resources in the Pacific Northwest 
and Great Lakes regions. In the latter, the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife 
Commission (GLIFWC) successfully negotiated and implemented a comprehensive 
memorandum of understanding with the United States Forest Service in order to 
provide for tribal regulatory authority and management of tribal members exercising 
 
91 Id. at 2-3. 
92 Id. at 3. 
93 Id. at 4-6. 
94 Id. at 4. 
95 Id. at 5. 
96 Id. at 6. 
97 See id. at 2 (“Nothing in this agreement shall be deemed as a concession by either party 
as to the other party's jurisdictional claims or an admission of the same, or a waiver of the 
right to challenge such claims upon termination of the Agreement.”) 
98 See Bernie Azure, Flathead Reservation Fish and Wildlife Board hears updates from CSKT 







their treaty rights on federal lands.99 While focused on the Tribes’ relationship with 
the federal government, this agreement highlights the benefit of an inter-tribal 
approach to addressing the management of shared resources and, as with the CSKT-
Montana cooperative agreement, demonstrates the potential to avoid or curtail 
lengthy litigation if the parties are interested in agreeing upon “shared principles and 
… clearly defined processes for joint decision-making and conflict resolution.”100  
Water and Water Rights. 
Tribal water rights in Oklahoma pose a significant and unresolved issue that existed 
prior to and regardless of McGirt. In its 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan, 
for example, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board (OWRB) recommended that, in 
order “[t]o address uncertainties relating to the water rights claims by the Tribal 
Nations of Oklahoma and to effectively apply the prior appropriation doctrine in the 
fair apportionment of state waters, the Oklahoma Governor and State Legislature 
should establish a formal consultation process as outlined” by a comprehensive 
report on the tribal water rights issues compiled by Professor Lindsay Robertson of 
the University of Oklahoma College of Law.101 The opening paragraph of that tribal 
issues report aptly summarizes the issues, which, despite the OWRB’s 2012 
recommendation, remain mostly unaddressed:  
As well- and long-recognized by the State of Oklahoma, the presence 
in the state of almost 40 federally-recognized tribal governments, 
some or all of which may have valid, federally-enforceable, treaty-
based claims to water, has resulted in uncertainty with regard to 
issues relating to ownership of and jurisdiction over water within the 
State’s geographic limits. These claims arise primarily from alleged 
reserved rights recognized in treaties between the tribes and the 
United States. Although no such rights have been judicially found to 
exist in Oklahoma, such rights have been recognized by federal 
 
99 See, e.g., The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, HONORING 
NATIONS: 2000 Honoree; Treaty Rights/National Forest Memorandum of Understanding 
Tribes of the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission, 
https://hpaied.org/sites/default/files/publications/Treaty%20Rights%20National%20Forest
%20Management%20MOU.pdf.  
100 Id. at 3; see also Columbia River Inter-Tribal Fish Commission, www.critfc.org; Brief of 
Amici Curiae Southern Ute Indian Tribe and Ute Mountain Ute Tribe in Support of 
Petitioner, Herrera v. Wyoming, No. 17-0532, 17-19 (filed Sept. 11, 2019) (detailing tribal-
state intergovernmental agreements to facilitate the exercise of off-reservation treaty 
rights); IBMP Partner Protocols, Inter-Agency Bison Management Plan, 
http://ibmp.info/Library/PartnerProtocols/PartnerProtocols_190404.pdf (detailing terms of 
federal-state-tribal agreements regarding the management of bison in and around 
Yellowstone National Park). 
101 Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Executive Report: 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive 






courts in litigation in other states, and tribes in Oklahoma have 
expressed confidence that their federal treaties would similarly be 
found to incorporate reserved water rights. Advocates for the Five 
Nations (the Cherokee Nation, the Chickasaw Nation, the Choctaw 
Nation, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and the Seminole Nation) have 
made the related argument that they have an even stronger claim 
based on treaty provisions granting those Nations their lands in fee 
simple. Like the Oklahoma tribal reserved rights claims, this claim 
has not been fully litigated.102  
Thus, while the formal recognition of the Five Tribes’ reservation boundaries does 
not directly impact the existence of or strength of the Tribes’ claims to water rights 
associated with the treaties that established those reservations in the first place, the 
resolution of those claims and the potential for expanded tribal management and 
protection of water resources could be considered in the context of other post-
McGirt developments. In fact, the discussion and work to resolve these issues could 
form an important basis on which to work toward solutions in other areas that do 
result from McGirt. In that instance, the assessment and balance of tribal and state 
regulatory authority described in the preceding contexts of environmental and 
natural resource regulation will be useful; however, with regard to water resources, 
the basis for those authorities may differ because of the strong but yet unresolved 
treaty-based claims to water rights described by Professor Robertson. The existence 
and resolution of these claims will therefore likely require a slightly different 
approach than those pursued in other regulatory arenas. 
The series of treaties through which the Five Tribes reserved lands in what is now 
Oklahoma provide the foundation for tribal claims to water and, as confirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court,103 a basis on which the Five Tribes may assert 
ownership rights in lands underlying waterways traversing their reservations. 
Traditionally, tribal water rights are analyzed according United States v. Winters, a 
1908 case in which the Supreme Court recognized that the federal government’s 
setting aside of lands for tribal nations also effectuates the reservation of 
appurtenant water rights sufficient to fulfill the purposes of those reservations.104 
But, while recognizing those rights, the Winters decision left the details of their 
quantification, scope, and extent unaddressed. 
The unique history of the Five Tribes’ land is distinct from the issues resolved in 
Winters, primarily because the United States guaranteed to the Tribes their land in 
 
102 Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan Supplemental 
Report: Tribal Issues & Recommendations, *1 (Feb. 2011), 
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fee status, never to become part of any state.105 Therefore, the Tribes acquired not 
only implied rights to water under Winters but potentially actual ownership of all of 
the water as well.106 This history flips the Winters analysis on its head because, as 
noted by Professor Taiawagi Helton, “the question is not, How much water was 
reserved in the tribes? but how much water has been taken away? …[a] shift [that] 
transfers the burden of establishing a right to water from the tribes to the state.”107  
The subsequent history of allotment and dispossession of those tribal lands may 
complicate the assessment of the Five Tribes rights to water but, if, as in McGirt,108 
that assessment relies on the foundational rules of federal Indian law such as 
requiring express Congressional action to divest tribes of their property and 
interests, these tribal rights remain valid.109  
In addition to providing a solid basis for the Five Tribes’ claims to water rights, the 
history of treaties and land ownership of the Five Tribes also supports broad tribal 
authority over the management and protection of those waters. As mentioned 
above, the United States Supreme Court confirmed tribal ownership of certain 
submerged lands underlying navigable waterways within their reservation 
boundaries in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.110 That ownership marks an additional 
critical distinction for the Five Tribes’ rights as the United States Supreme Court 
relied on the ownership of similar submerged lands by the State of Montana to limit 
tribal regulatory authority over non-tribal members in those areas.111 Therefore, in 
addition to ownership-based claims to water, the Five Tribes may also be able to 
assert broader sovereign control of those resources, including property-based rights 
to exclude or condition entry upon submerged lands.112 
Notwithstanding the potential strength of these claims as a legal matter, however, 
successfully adjudicating and vindicating them may present significant challenges. 
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First, water resources in Oklahoma are limited to two main river basins and access 
to groundwater.113 These limited sources increase the likelihood of competition for 
water resources, even among the Five Tribes, and demand a comprehensive and 
nuanced understanding of hydrology in order to identify existing claims, uses, and 
capacity. Given those limits, the State of Oklahoma is likely to assert various 
arguments in opposition to the assertion of broad tribal claims to water or water 
management.114 While the 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan suggests a 
softening of potential State opposition to tribal claims, earlier plans relied on an 
outdated misunderstanding of the status of Indian reservations within the State’s 
boundaries.115 Similarly, the State initially stridently opposed efforts of the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw efforts to protect their water resources but, ultimately, the 
parties were able to reach a comprehensive settlement of those tribal claims.116  
Furthermore, despite the legitimacy of tribal legal claims, the State’s practical 
reliance upon existing uses and claims to water rights and water management may 
present further barriers to the Five Tribes actually securing the full extent of their 
claims. The United States Supreme Court seems particularly sensitive to these 
concerns,117 however, in the context of federal and tribal reserved water rights, the 
federal government has also traditionally deferred to state policies, interests, and 
laws.118 Therefore, in addition to adjudicating their legal claims to water, the Five 
Tribes may also consider non-litigated solutions to securing appropriate rights to 
water and water management. The following lessons and examples may be useful in 
those efforts. 
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Closest to home is the example offered by the 2016 settlement agreement regarding 
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations’ efforts to protect the waters of their 
homelands. Through that agreement, each Nation was able to secure defined rights 
to access and use water and confirm the rights of individual tribal allottees to certain 
water resources as well.119 In addition, the parties committed to greater involvement 
and collaboration on future water planning efforts in recognition of their shared 
interests in the region’s resources.120 To reach that agreement required some 
compromises, however, including the waiver by the United States and the Nations 
of their rights to assert certain claims regarding rights to water or water 
management.121  
Similar settlement agreements abound across Indian Country and many tribes, 
states, and the United States have hammered out mutually beneficial resolutions of 
long-standing and conflicting claims to water resources.122 Key to those 
arrangements has been a solid foundation on which each party can assert, assess, 
and negotiate its interests in the context of competing claims and priorities. As 
Professor Robertson noted in his 2011 recommendations, various models for such 
negotiations could be considered and he specifically mentioned the way in which 
these matters were negotiated in the State of Montana.123 There, the State 
established a reserved water rights compact commission and charged it with 
identifying, negotiating, and resolving tribal and federal claims to reserved water 
rights.124 The result has been the slow, but steady, securing of agreements with each 
of the Tribes in Montana as well as the resolution of claims by the United States.125  
Of these, the most recent agreement is the compact entered into between the 
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) and the State of Montana.126 Like 
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Settlement, to secure agreement from Montana and the 
federal government, the CSKT waived their claims to extensive water rights in 
 
119 See Secs. 7 & 8, State of Oklahoma, Choctaw Nation of Oklahoma, Chickasaw Nation, City 
of Oklahoma City Water Settlement, 60-73 (August 2016), available at 
https://www.waterunityok.com/media/1075/agreement-160808.pdf.  
120 Id. at 73-74. 
121 Id. at 12-18. 
122 See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK at § 19.05[2], 1247-48 (listing settlements). 
123 Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan Supplemental 
Report: Tribal Issues & Recommendations, *7-8 (Feb. 2011), 
http://www.owrb.ok.gov/supply/ocwp/pdf_ocwp/WaterPlanUpdate/draftreports/OCWP_T
ribalWater_IssuesRecs.pdf.  
124 See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. §§ 85-2-701, et seq. (2020).  
125 See Montana Dept. of Natural Resources and Conservation, Approved Compacts, 
http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/water-compact-implementation-program/approved-
compacts (last visited Dec. 29, 2020). 
126 See Montana Dept. of Natural Resources and Conservation, Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes Compact, http://dnrc.mt.gov/divisions/water/water-compact-
implementation-program/confederated-salish-and-kootenai-tribes-compact (last visited 




exchange for defined and certain water rights.127 In addition, however, the CSKT 
compact also provides for unitary administration and management of on-reservation 
water rights by a joint tribal-state entity.128 Like the tribal-state wildlife commission 
described above, this arrangement cements a critical platform for continuing tribal-
state cooperation in the oversight and regulation of the water resources shared on 
the reservation by tribal and non-tribal citizens. 
The Five Tribes may seek to pursue other approaches for asserting and protecting 
their water resources as well. Even where their rights to water have not yet been 
adjudicated or quantified, the Tribes may seek to exert broader legal and regulatory 
control over water management. The legal basis for claiming such control, rooted in 
tribal claims to ownership of both water and submerged lands and cemented by the 
treaty history described above, could provide a broader and stronger foundation 
than the limitations posed by the Montana framework.129 Even then, however, there 
may still be important qualifying factors on such tribal authority. On the Colville 
Indian Reservation in Washington, for example, the Confederated Tribes there have 
secured judicial confirmation of their rights to water and the authority to regulate 
those resources.130 The Tribes have adopted a tribal code governing permitting and 
use of those waters by all (tribal and non-tribal) citizens.131  
Similarly, in August 2019, the Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians adopted a tribal 
ordinance governing the permitting and use of groundwater in order to protect and 
manage those precious resources.132 The adoption of that tribal regulatory structure 
followed the Band’s victory in securing the recognition of their reserved rights to 
groundwater and, in adopting the tribal ordinance, the Band sought to apply it 
broadly to anyone, tribal member or not, “producing or desiring to produce” 
groundwater appurtenant to the Band’s Reservation.133 In doing so, the Band 
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expressly found that non-members producing groundwater on the Reservation had 
consented and were therefore subject to the Band’s regulatory jurisdiction.134 
But, while these broad assertions of tribal regulatory authority over water resources 
may be rooted in reasonable application of relevant legal standards, Professor 
Robert T. Anderson cautions that, “Tribes in similar situations [to the Colville Tribes] 
will need to take seriously the need to accord some respect to state water-right-
holders.”135 If prior conflicts over tribal resources and authority in Oklahoma are any 
indication, efforts by the Five Tribes to unilaterally assert broader regulatory power 
over water resources within their Reservations are likely to be countered by stiff 
opposition from the State and its allies. Therefore, another potential path forward is 
offered by Professor Robertson’s recommendations to the OWRB, which were 
adopted in the 2012 Oklahoma Comprehensive Water Plan: 
1. That the State determine who within state government has the 
authority to approve a process for negotiation of water rights issues 
with tribes, who within state government has the authority to conduct 
such negotiations, and what the approval process is once negotiations 
are complete. 
2. That the State assemble a team fully authorized to meet with tribal 
representatives to devise a process for the discussion and resolution of 
tribal water rights claims. 
3. That upon the determination of process, the State appoint a fully 
authorized negotiating team to begin discussions with tribal 
representatives. 
4. That upon the conclusion of negotiations (either individual, group or 
otherwise, as determined by the process planners), the results be 
submitted for such State approval as is required. 
5. That the State consider the implementation of regular consultation 
protocols.136 
While those recommendations focus on actions that the State of Oklahoma should 
take to consider addressing the Five Tribes rights to water, pursuing the 
establishment of a solid state-tribal forum in which these (and other) issues could be 
effectively broached, addressed, and ideally resolved, may be an important next step 
for the Five Tribes to consider. While the McGirt decision is prompting such 
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discussion across a range of policy matters, issues of water rights and management 
present a unique opportunity in that they were identified well before McGirt was 
decided and there is already a record of some success in reaching a collaborative 
path forward. 
Conclusion. 
The leaders of the Five Tribes and other policy-makers in eastern Oklahoma are faced 
with a wide range of options for addressing the post-McGirt world. Each strategic 
decision will need to weigh the risks, costs, and benefits of these approaches, which 
may vary from strident, unilateral assertions of sovereign authority to a more passive 
maintenance of (mostly state-dominated) status quo ante. With regard to regulation 
and protection of the environment, natural resources, and water of the region, these 
policy-makers must wrestle with each of these challenges in a highly contentious 
context, made more difficult by the shared and transitory nature of those subjects. 
Hopefully, this briefing paper can help support and inform those decisions by 
providing useful background and context along with lessons and examples of how 
others addressed similar challenges in other settings. 
 
